Volume 6, Issue 1, 2025, pp. 27-67

ABSTRACT: In wars and armed conflicts, it is not uncommon that members of opposing armies shoot at each other, leading to “crossfire” killing civilians in the process. In cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC), crossfire has been employed as a defence by lawyers of the accused to abdicate responsibilities. A prominent example is Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, in which the Defence contends that there was crossfire by member of the LRA and the Ugandan army, or at least remains a possibility. Therefore, the accused cannot be held liable for certain charges such as murder. Unfortunately, in all of these ICC cases, the Courts failed to address this issue of crossfire. This Article challenges this defence and argues that crossfire does not break the chain of causation of murder under International Criminal Law (ICL). Hence, inducing a crossfire knowingly with an intent to kill civilians would constitute murder under the Rome Statute. It builds its arguments by examining 1) provisions related to the crime of murder under the Rome Statute and other ICC statutes; 2) the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals; 3) customary international law, including international humanitarian law and 4) jurisprudence of common law and civil law countries, as well as Islamic Criminal Law. The Article seeks to inspire the ICC to develop the law of causation under ICL.