Volume 7, Issue 1, 2026, pp. 53-63

ABSTRACT: Nationality sits at the heart of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction under Article 12(2)(b) of the Rome Statute, yet the Statute offers no settled definition of the term. In case involving dual nationals, the Office of the Prosecutor has not grounded its analysis in any settled rule of international law, and has instead looked to the practical rights nationality is thought to provide. In fact, traditional doctrines such as the “genuine link” and “dominant nationality” tests provide only limited guidance: originating in the context of diplomatic protection, they do not translate neatly to international criminal jurisdiction. Treaty interpretation, by contrast, supports the exercise of active nationality jurisdiction whenever an accused with multiple nationalities holds the nationality of a State Party. However, in practice, it remains necessary for the Court to adopt a functional approach to assess which nationalities can properly ground its jurisdiction. Individual consent is not a workable criterion, whereas nationality conferred or revoked on discriminatory grounds cannot be recognized under international law and should not provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It proposes a functional approach that balances respect for state sovereignty with the imperative to prevent impunity, keeping the Court’s treatment of dual nationals both legally sound and operationally effective.